1 William J. Becker, Jr., Esq. (SBN 134545) THE BECKER LAW FIRM 2 11500 Olympic, Blvd., Suite 400 Los Angeles, California 90064 3 Phone: (310) 636-1018 FEB 15 2012 Fax: (310) 765-6328 4 OHN A CLARKE CLERK Attorneys for Plaintiff, David Coppedge 5 SANCHEZ DEPUTY 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 10 DAVID COPPEDGE, an individual; Case No. BC435600 11 Plaintiff, The Honorable Ernest M. Hi 12 13 VS. PLAINTIFF DAVID COPPEDGE'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S 14 JET PROPULSION LABORATORY, form **OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S** unknown; CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF **MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 RE:** 15 **TECHNOLOGY**, form unknown; POLITICAL ACTIVITY; GREGORY CHIN, an Individual; CLARK 16 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND A. BURGESS, an Individual; KEVIN **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT** 17 KLENK, an Individual; and Does 1 through **THEREOF** 25, inclusive, 18 FSC: February 24,2012 9:00 a.m. **HEARING TIME:** Defendants. 19 DEPT: 54 20 Trial Date: March 7, 2012 21 22 COMES NOW PLAINTIFF David Coppedge and hereby submits his Reply to Defendant 23 California Institute of Technology's ("JPL's) Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 24 Re: Political Activity as follows: 25 26 27 28

BC435600

Plf.'s Reply Re: Plf's Mot. In Lim. No. 3 Re: Political Activity

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE ARE PROCEDURALLY FAVORED AND NOT UNTIMELY.

Plaintiff's instant Motion in Limine was not filed in violation of any court order or court rule. Defendant's protest of the instant Motion asserts untimeliness, but that assertion is insufficient. To prevail here, Defendant "must demonstrate not only that the notice was defective, but that he or she was *prejudiced*.... Procedural defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties do not constitute reversible error." *Reedy v. Bussell* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288-1289 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

All of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine are brought to facilitate the smooth delivery of relevant and not unduly prejudicial evidence at trial. Motions in limine avoid problems of trying to "unring the bell," and they "permit more careful consideration of evidentiary issues than would take place in the heat of battle during trial. They minimize sidebar conferences and disruptions during trial, allowing for an uninterrupted flow of evidence. Finally, by resolving potentially critical issues at the outset, they enhance the efficiency of trials and promote settlements." *Kelly v. New West Federal Savings* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 669 (citations omitted), quoted and followed by *Mansur v. Ford Motor Co.* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1386. If Plaintiff's Motions are denied solely on timeliness grounds, then the same objections will be raised during trial anyway. Resolving the evidentiary issues on their merits before trial benefits the court, all parties, and the jury.

II. DEFENDANT JPL AGREES TO FOREGO EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT RE: COPPEDGE'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

Plaintiff Coppedge's instant Motion in Limine No. 3 on page 5 makes this argument and request:

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"JPL should not be allowed to say it had a right the law says it does not have, i.e. to interfere with an employee's political speech activities. For all the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to enter an order precluding JPL from introducing testimony or documents, or presenting any argument, suggesting it had a right to interfere with Coppedge's political activities."

(Emphasis added.)

Agreeing with Plaintiff's request, Defendant's "Opposition" at page 1, lines 10-11, states:

"Caltech has never argued that it had a "right" to interfere with Coppedge's political activities, nor does it plan to do so at trial."

(Emphasis added.)

Defendant's "Opposition" restates its agreement, and thus only nominally requests denial of the instant motion (emphasis added):

"Although Caltech has no intention of arguing that it had a "right" to interfere with any particular kind of speech, political or otherwise, there are no grounds for granting this Motion."

(Deft.'s Opp. Br., 6:3-4, emphasis added.)

III. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF COPPEDGE'S SUBSTANTIALLY UNOPPOSED MOTION

This Court has the discretion to grant a meritorious unopposed motion. *See Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538, 543 (holding superior court has discretion to grant unopposed summary judgment motion). This Court also has the inherent discretion to control the admission and exclusion of evidence. *People v. Rodriguez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 10; *Ghadrdan v. Gorabi* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 416, 420-421 (same).

This Court has previously ruled that Coppedge may not argue JPL violated Coppedge's rights by interfering with Coppedge's activities protected under Labor Code section 1101. In reciprocal fairness, JPL should not be permitted to argue its "right" to interfere as a defense of JPL's conduct. JPL apparently agrees, as quoted above verbatim from its brief.

IV. GIVEN JPL'S NON-OPPOSITION TO COPPEDGE'S SUBSTANTIVE REQUEST, JPL'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE MOOT; JPL'S DEMAND TO INTRODUCE CONTENTS OF CONVERSATIONS FACIALLY CONTRADICTS ITS CONTENT-NEUTRALITY ASSERTION

If neither JPL nor Coppedge may argue the issue of Coppedge's Labor Code section 1101 right to political activity, then the content of conversations, debates, "insults" and arguments is irrelevant if their content is political. JPL's "Opposition" brief on page 1 expressly states:

As JPL has maintained throughout this lawsuit, it disciplined Coppedge because of the manner of his speech, without respect to its content. JPL does have the right, indeed the obligation, to regulate employee conduct in the workplace, to prevent unwelcome, offensive and/or disruptive conduct, and that is all JPL sought to do here.

(JPL's Opp. Br. 1:11-14 (emphasis added).)

To establish "conduct" or "manner of his speech without respect to its content," JPL needs only to provide evidence about "the frequency of the offensive acts or encounters," the "number of days" over which "the offensive conduct occurred," and "the context" of Coppedge's alleged conduct. See Herberg v. California Institute of the Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142, 150 (employing a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to workplace harassment allegations).

While in Herberg, supra, the accused employee's "words" were judged for their offensive qualities, here JPL expressly disclaims concern about the Coppedge's words. Only the "manner" and "conduct" are at issue, JPL says.

Therefore, JPL could offer evidence of the number and types of conversations that

Coppedge had with coworkers to establish the alleged objectionable "manner" or "conduct." Evidence of shouting, repeated and prolonged arguments, whether profanity or obscene language was used – any of these items could be offered without ever mentioning the subject matter (content) or the words of the conversations. Because JPL insists the conversations' content was irrelevant to the discipline decision, it would not matter whether the conversations were about poli-

tics or baseball – and it would not be important to the jury to know the contents of the conversa-tions either. V. **CONCLUSION** For the reasons set forth in the instant Motion and this Reply, Plaintiff Coppedge respect-fully requests this Court grant Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3. DATED: February 15, 2012 THE BECKER LAW FIRM William J Becker Jr, Esq By: WILLIAM J. BECKER, JR., ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiff, DAVID COPPEDGE

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